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Medicaid, Managed Care, and Kids
Today, I will talk about what managed care for Medicaid is,
how it influences kids, and how it relates to the State Child
Health Insurance Program (CHIP). I will focus on what we
have learned over the last 20 years through research about cost,
use, and quality. I will also discuss some of the expectations we
had for children covered by Medicaid managed care. Finally, I
will talk about the future of Medicaid managed care and the
implications for CHIP.
Managed care is risk-based care. That is, the providers of service
generally are at risk from a financial perspective. Managed care
plans provide a wide range of comprehensive health care services
to an enrolled population of patients in exchange for a fixed
periodic payment per head, called the capitation rate. Health
maintenance organizations (HMOs), which are the best known
form of managed care and a common form of Medicaid managed
care, typically employ some form of capitation to pay the
providers who are affiliated with them or engage in other
payment relationships that share the risk of the typical insurance
company with those providers. Services can be provided through
either a decentralized or highly centralized set of medical
facilities.
Primary care case management (PCCM) is another plan type
utilized for Medicaid managed care contracting. In a PCCM,
Medicaid beneficiaries enroll with a specific primary care
provider or agency, often called the gatekeeper, who is
responsible for coordinating their medical care and for arranging
all necessary referrals to consultants, hospitals, or special
Note: Terms that appear in bold are defined in the glossary
at the end of the text.
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services. Typically, the gatekeeper’s prior approval is required
for the managed care company to pay for specialty and hospital
except in true emergency situations.
The central question we examine is: How do these two forms of
managed care, HMOs and PCCMs, compare in terms of
expenditures, utilization rates, and quality of care, in contrast to
the old fee-for-service Medicaid system, which is rarely seen
anymore? And specifically: How well do they meet the needs of
kids?

Background
In 1993, with Eugene Lewit at the Packard Foundation, I wrote,
Though the evidence suggests that managed care is
here to stay, there is disagreement about what, if any,
impact managed care has had on health care and
costs. Moreover, little of the deluge of propaganda
and research on the effects of managed care has
focused in a rigorous empirical and scientific manner
on whether managed care is good for children and
pregnant women. Our research suggests that available
research does not support most claims of large cost
savings or improved quality of care for children and
pregnant women as a result of managed care.
What, if anything, has happened since 1993 to change this
assessment?
Managed care has actually been around in some form since at
least the 1960s, when Kaiser Permanente in the northwest region,
under the leadership of a man named Ernie Saward (well known
in the Rochester, New York, community before then), started,
with funding support from the State of California, enrolling lowincome persons. There was nothing in those days named
managed care, although there were prepaid group practices,
Kaiser being one of the first established in 1948.

2

Deborah A. Freund

It was actually in the Nixon administration that the term “health
maintenance organization” was coined. Paul M. Ellwood, M.D., a
Minneapolis physician who directed the American Rehabilitation
Foundation, had been arguing for several years that the
fundamental structural incentives associated with fee-for-service
medicine should be shifted. The financing system, according to
Ellwood, should reward health maintenance rather than reward
providers for each service rendered. As an alternative to both feefor-service and centralized governmental financing, Ellwood
recommended prepayment for comprehensive care. He suggested
calling these groups of providers “health maintenance
organizations.” His efforts led, in part, to the passage of the
National Health Maintenance Act of 1973 which provided
funding for grants and loans to new HMOs.
However, it wasn’t until Ronald Reagan became President in
1980 that any decision was made to try to move people covered
by Medicare and Medicaid into managed care. I happened to be
on the first panel that was drawn up during the Reagan
Administration to award the first national contracts for Medicaid
to enroll persons in HMOs, or what came later to be known as
managed care organizations. The Omnibus Budget Reconciliation
Act (OBRA) of 1981 allowed states for the first time to enroll
parts of their Medicaid populations into managed care through a
process called waivers. Waivers allowed states to essentially
break the laws governing “statewideness.” Under the law,
statewideness meant care had to be delivered to all Medicaid
beneficiaries in the same way. A lot of places in those days
wanted to break the law and selectively provide managed care
opportunities to Medicaid beneficiaries residing in some but not
all localities in the state. We’ll talk about why in a minute.
If you look at what’s happened to Medicaid enrollment in
managed care over the years, you can see the tremendous growth
that happened in the 1990s. If you will recall, in the early 1990s
there was an economic recession that coincided with the start in
this growth. Discretionary or entitlement spending in the states
started to outstrip the ability of the states to pay for it, and
legislatures all over the country were looking for anything that
3
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would help reduce costs. In health care, a lot of people decided
that managed care enrollment would accomplish this objective in
the Medicaid program. That is why we saw the large growth.
Forty states started to experiment with moving groups of
Medicaid-eligible persons into managed care, first in a voluntary
way and then, by the late 1990s, on a mandatory basis. Now, 48
of 50 states use this vehicle for their Medicaid population. In
many of those states it’s the only game in town.
Whereas in the early 1990s only about 10 percent of the
approximately 3 million people eligible for Medicaid were in
managed care, by 1998 it was 53.6 percent or 16.6 million
Medicaid beneficiaries, and now it’s almost 60 percent. As the
non-standard populations, such as those with chronic illness who
are covered through SSI, or what was SSI, become enrolled, we
will continue to see growth.
The percentage of the total Medicaid population in managed care
varies widely, although most states have at least 25 percent, and
31 states have at least half (including New York) of their
Medicaid beneficiaries in managed care. Medicaid managed care
in New York goes back to the beginning of Medicaid, but it was
quite limited until the early 1990s. Legislation in 1991 and 1992
initially spurred the growth of voluntary programs, but that
growth quickly leveled off. In 1995 New York applied for a
section 1915(b) waiver to move to a mandatory program, and it
was approved in 1997. Other states, like Minnesota, Washington,
and Massachusetts, where the penetration is over 75 percent,
have been in this business almost since the beginning.
In 1998, 41.4 million people were enrolled in the Medicaid
program, including 18.9 million children, 7.9 million adults, 3.9
million elderly, and 6.6 million people who were blind or
disabled. About 55 percent of the enrollment in Medicaid
managed care is children.
Medicaid managed care originally started with mostly voluntary
enrollment, but by 1998, 82 percent of all the states had moved
4

Deborah A. Freund

into mandatory enrollment, where there is no choice: it’s an
HMO or nothing if you’re in Medicaid. For those states that use
the primary care case management, or PCCM vehicle, the same is
true, only since it’s viewed as less restrictive, those that mandate
it do so 93 percent of the time.

Welfare Reform and the Beginning of CHIP
In 1988, Medicaid provided health insurance for 15.6 percent of
all children. By 1993, Medicaid coverage of children grew to
23.9 percent. During this same time period, however, employersponsored insurance coverage for children under age 18 declined
from approximately 64 percent to 57 percent. As a result, many
children residing in families with incomes too high to qualify for
Medicaid were left uninsured (HCFA 2000).
In 1996, Congress decided to get rid of welfare as we knew it and
passed the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity
Reconciliation Act, which among other things broke the link
between welfare eligibility and Medicaid eligibility. Previously,
you had to be eligible for welfare to get Medicaid. Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) was replaced by
Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) and Medicaid
is a stand-alone program. On the heels of that reform, Congress
passed the Balanced Budget Act of 1997, which established the
Child Health Insurance Program (CHIP). Its basic aim was to
enroll all uninsured children in a health insurance program. States
were given three options: expanding their Medicaid program to
cover uninsured kids, rolling our their own CHIP program, or
some combination of the two, as long as they met certain criteria.
As of June 2000, 23 states and territories have expanded their
Medicaid programs, 15 started CHIP programs, and 18 turned to
a combination of the two.
States that actually expanded their Medicaid programs, extending
them to include kids who didn’t qualify for Medicaid before the
new law but now did, used a managed care model. Similarly,
those that chose to develop their own programs, which by and
large were supposed to mimic more what a private sector
5
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program would look like, also chose to use the managed care
model and sometimes the local Medicaid managed care delivery
system or part of that delivery system to deliver care to those
kids. You can’t look these days at the CHIP program without
realizing that it’s strongly connected to Medicaid managed care.
Therefore, what we can learn from Medicaid managed care for
kids may also apply to those kids who never had health insurance
before but now are covered by CHIP. Often, the kids covered
under CHIP are going to the same providers as those who are
covered under Medicaid managed care.
The percentage of uninsured children who actually receive
coverage through the CHIP program also varies greatly by state.
New York is in the highest group, with more than half of
uninsured children covered, while many other states have barely
figured out how to do it (currently, 15 states cover 15 percent or
less of their uninsured children). Despite how well we’re doing,
only 2 million of the 7.2 million uninsured kids under age 19 in
the entire country were covered by CHIP as of last year, and a
large fraction of those, of course, were in New York. So we have
a long way to go.

Research Findings
Now, I want to talk now about the particular research that I’ve
done focusing on Medicaid managed care for over almost two
decades, highlighting the findings and what we might conclude
about best practices in Medicaid managed care. By and large, all
of my studies focus solely on what was then known as AFDC,
which is why I decided today to talk about kids. In my own CHIP
study, we are focusing particularly on kids with special health
care needs, those who are chronically and seriously ill, and who
access other state resources, because little is known about them.
Across all my studies I have looked at three program prototypes:
•
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No financial incentives, but may pay case management fee
These are the PCCM programs
•

Type 2: At-Risk Primary Care Gatekeeping
Enrolled with primary care physician/clinic
Financial incentives for primary care physicians and maybe
others
• Type 3: HMO/Prepaid Health Plan Enrollment
Enrolled with integrated delivery system
Plan is paid capitation
In a Type 3 program model, for example, you might have three
HMOs in a community, and a Medicaid beneficiary must get
enrolled and get all his or her health care from one of the three.
Hypotheses: What did we expect to find when there is a
high degree of penetration of Medicaid managed care?
Essentially, the premise is that access would improve, resulting in
better quality of care, to the extent that it could be measured. And
money would be saved along the way. Specifically, we believe
that as more Medicaid-eligible individuals are enrolled into
managed care:
1.

Hospital use will decline.

In the early days of prepaid group practice and HMOs, the idea
was if you prepaid for health care, you would think very hard
about how every health care dollar was spent, and you would cut
out everything that was unnecessary. The prevailing wisdom at
the time was that a lot of things that happened in the hospital
were unnecessary, and that expensive hospital use could be
reduced.
2.

Emergency room (ER) use will decline.

It’s simply a truism that people who are uninsured or poor have
lacked access to health care and to physicians, and because of it
used emergency rooms for their care. There were also people
7
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who believed that Medicaid beneficiaries didn’t take care of
themselves, or might even have been drug abusers and doctorshopped, simply went from doctor to doctor to doctor, or ER to
ER to ER, to get prescriptions.
Now, as for physician use, there was a controversy.
3a.

One group said if you provide greater access to
mainstream medicine and a relationship with a primary
care physician that they never had, then physician use, at
least on the outpatient side, should go up.

3b.

But specialty use might go down if it had been
overutilized or misutilized.

4.

Expenditures or costs would be reduced through lessened
hospital and emergency room use.

We tried to find out through all of these studies whether or not
those hypotheses were borne out by the data.
Data and Methodology

With a few exceptions, all of these studies were quasiexperiments. We observed people who were in Medicaid
managed care in one community and then tried to find a similar
community in that state where Medicaid managed care hadn’t
been introduced, and compared the experience of the people who
were in Medicaid managed care to that of people who were not.
We wanted to look at what happened to Medicaid beneficiaries
before they went into managed care and after in comparison to
Medicaid beneficiaries who were not in managed care.
We used a variety of sources of data. The predominant data that
I’m talking about today is claims data. When a health care
provider bills for a service they submit an insurance claim. The
claim essentially says: “I provided this service to this person and
this is what my charge is.” The provider sends it in and expects
some reimbursement, these days a lot lower than what they
would have hoped for in the past. In managed care, because
8
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providers aren’t paid on a fee-for-service basis, there is no reason
to submit a claim. Instead, we used pseudo-claims; states
mandated physicians who were seeing Medicaid beneficiaries
under managed care to submit an informational claim without a
charge, simply to say what they did to whom, and for what
reason. Or we actually used their encounters, where we went into
their offices or into the managed care plans and collected the data
ourselves. For some of the quality of care analyses, we actually
did large extractions from medical records and patient surveys.
The variables we used throughout our research include: age, race,
sex or gender, months of eligibility, enrollment in Medicaid
managed care and for how long, previous expenses, self-reported
health status, and detailed clinical information about the patients’
experiences.
I now summarize findings from many of my studies that have
appeared in the literature. [For a list of articles from which these
observations were taken, see References at the end of the text.]
Medicaid Competition Demonstrations, 1983-1989

We observed demonstration programs in California, Missouri,
Minnesota, and New Jersey. In reporting these findings to you, I
have taken away all the numbers because they cloud the story
that I want to tell.
•

Hospital use: there wasn’t an effect a lot of the time, but
when there was it was in the right direction: managed care
leads to less hospital utilization.

•

Emergency room use: this is the strongest finding across my
studies. ER use takes a plummet under Medicaid managed
care and that’s precisely what you want.

•

Physician care, in particular primary care physician care:
it does not go in the direction that you would want to see.
That is, you see fewer visits to both primary care physicians
and specialists than under fee-for-service. Later on I’ll show
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you that this result is related to the way those physicians are
paid, that is, it’s due to capitation payment.
•

Cost savings: where they occurred, the cost savings were not
great. Legislators who were looking for big declines in what
they would pay from public coffers for Medicaid would not
be happy. Even where there was a significant decrease in
expenditure, it was in the range of 10 percent or less, and
most of the time we didn’t find that.

Meta Analysis, 1992

When we broadened our field of inquiry to look at all the studies
that existed as of 1992, what did we find? Basically we found the
same thing. There were 250 studies at that time, but we
eliminated those that didn’t have some kind of comparison group
or some kind of statistical analysis that would allow us to
compare the underlying populations. That left 25 studies,
including waiver packages, that met our criteria. We then
analyzed results from a subset of 12 programs with the strongest
methodologies.
In inpatient use, we saw very mixed results; it wasn’t convincing
across all of the studies that Medicaid managed care produced
much of a decline. This really makes sense if you think about
what’s going on with kids. Aside from those who were seriously
ill, they were in the hospital largely for birth or for minor things.
We saw a similar pattern of use for moms. So if this was the
place you were going to save, at least hypothetically, this is not
the place you would expect to find large savings.
Emergency room use declined in 75 percent of the studies. In 75
percent of the studies, physician visits either declined or there
was no change. Only in 25 percent of the studies did physician
visits for kids increase. Finally, 58 percent of the studies showed
some cost savings, in the range of 5 to 20 percent.
Mandatory versus Voluntary Enrollment

Of the 25 programs we studied, 19 involved mandatory
enrollment and 6 had voluntary enrollment. The major question
10
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was: Do you have to conscript Medicaid beneficiaries to get the
advantages, if any, of Medicaid managed care? Basically the
bottom line is that you do. You realize greater savings if you
mandate enrollment in managed care, particularly through
declines in hospital use, but you can achieve similar reductions in
ER use through either voluntary or mandatory programs.
Capitation versus Fee-for-Service Reimbursement

How much of that is really due to Medicaid managed care versus
the particular way in which you pay a hospital or a physician? Of
the 25 programs in the study, 17 paid by capitation and 8 by feefor-service. We found an increase in physician use 63 percent of
the time under fee-for-service, compared to 35 percent of the
time when physicians were paid under capitation. Therefore, if
you want to increase primary care physician use you don’t want
to pay physicians with capitation but if you are interested in
reducing specialty use, capitation may be the approach.
We also observed a decrease in emergency room use
approximately 50 percent of the time, regardless of the method of
reimbursement. We attributed this result to the effect of the
gatekeeper mechanism.
With regard to inpatient use, you can reduce inpatient use
whether or not you pay hospitals on a capitation rate. It all has to
do with the type of utilization review that you use. It isn’t in the
payment mechanism. What seems to matter is the overall
payment to the managed care organization, and not the specific
way in which you pay providers.
Summary of Program Effects by Prototype

Of the 25 programs we studied, 8 were Type 1, 11 were Type 2,
and 6 were Type 3, as described earlier. Type 1 programs exhibit
the largest increase in physician visits, while the largest declines
appear in the fully capitated models. For ER use, because it all
comes through a gatekeeper, it doesn’t matter what model you
use. You can achieve declines in inpatient use from all three
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models. And similar cost savings are achieved by all three
models.
1915(b) Waiver Program Evaluations, 1993-1997

Research evaluating the 1915(b) waiver program show some
things that are similar. When we looked at access to care, we
were basically looking at whether Early Periodic Screening and
Diagnostic Testing (EPSDT) referrals continued under managed
care in comparison to fee-for-service. Where we could measure
it, it did. Similarly, what happened to the rate of ambulatory
sensitive conditions? These are conditions where hospitalizations
are thought to be avoidable by good primary care. Where we
could measure it across all studies, we found that there were
fewer of these hospitalizations that could have been avoided
under managed care in comparison to fee-for-service, which
people in the field like to attribute to better access to care, one of
the goals of Medicaid managed care.
When we looked at the direction of significant impacts on
utilization and expenditures for Medicaid children, we found
exactly the same things in the 1990s as I found in the 1980s.
Preventive Care: Immunizations, Birth Weight

Finally, we looked at claims data to measure the impacts on
quality of care. Once again, my 1980s study did it, but with very
different data. A key question is, of course: Was there any
clinical or outcomes benefit to the patients? And the answer is
sometimes there was, but more often there wasn’t.
We looked at compliance with well child care periodicity
schedules on two occasions. In one case we found an
improvement, and in one we didn’t. Where we could look at
compliance with immunization schedules, we found almost no
difference, and I’ll tell you why. First of all, managed care and
Medicaid fee-for-service have very, very low immunization
compliance rates. A lot of these plans actually carve out
immunizations; states don’t pay managed care companies to
provide immunizations. People have to continue to go to health
12
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departments or clinics to get them. And when it’s not
coordinated, they don’t get it. There were many instances where
people got them in private physicians’ offices, because those
physicians believed in immunizations so much that they provided
them themselves, without compensation.
We also looked at birth weight. If mothers get into prenatal care
earlier by virtue of managed care, does the birth weight of those
babies rise? Generally there’s a very high correlation between
poverty and birth weight. If a child is born into poverty it is much
more likely to weigh five pounds or less at birth, because its mom
has had poor nutrition, probably didn’t get good access to health
care for herself, and didn’t have prenatal care, among other
things. Basically we found no difference at all between programs.
Where we could measure it, where birth weights actually
improved in two cases, they improved very little.

Conclusion
So where does this leave us? What’s the bottom line? The bottom
line, I think, is that managed care is here to stay, even though it
hasn’t met its promises. We’re going to continue to see it used for
Medicaid. The use changes that we expected to see happened on
the hospital and ER side, but there’s no evidence that access to
physician care nationally improved. Quality improvement is
sometimes demonstrated, but not all that often. Savings are
modest.
The Challenges for CHIP
Earlier I mentioned that of the 7.2 million kids nationally who
might be eligible for CHIP program, only 2 million or so were
enrolled. We’re having problems just getting those kids into
CHIP, getting them health insurance. When we lay Medicaid
managed care models on top of that, we may find that, unless
we’re careful, there will be no improvement in quality and we
will have spent a lot of money. This means that we have to focus
our efforts on outreach to the families, to entice them into CHIP,
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and then on how to get physician care. We probably can’t meet
those two goals through models of Medicaid managed care.
Best Practices
When Medicaid managed care came into full force in the 1990s
(versus the gradual way it was phased in during the 1980s), it was
during a time of economic recession, when we were looking for
large savings, or at least to blunt the rate of growth of expenses.
As a result, no new money was put in, and overall the rate of
reimbursements was cut. If new monies were put in, it was
simply because more people became eligible through either
mandatory or voluntary eligibility expansions to Medicaid.
Medicaid has underpaid every provider since its beginning, but
Medicaid managed care is in the position of trying to do
something that the fee-for-service system was never able to do.
As you know if you read the front page, there’s been a major
exodus out of managed care in the Medicare program, and we’re
beginning to see that exodus in Medicaid, too, due to
underfinancing.
If we don’t tackle all of our problems in a cooperative way, and if
we’re unable to spend more money, we will be unable to protect
our children and their future. How we do it remains to be seen. I
can envision a public sector solution and I can envision a private
sector solution.
Nevertheless, I conclude in the year 2000 with exactly what I
wrote in 1993. Our review, and mine today, suggests that
available research does not support most claims of cost savings
and improved quality of care for children and pregnant women in
Medicaid as a result of managed care.
Thank you.
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organizing vehicle for the Foundation’s work on health care for
low-income people. The Commission functions as a policy
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institute and forum for analyzing health care coverage and access
for the low-income population and assessing options for reform.
The Commission, begun in 1991, strives to bring increased public
awareness and expanded analytic effort to the policy debate over
health coverage and access, with a special focus on Medicaid and
the uninsured. The Commission is based at the Foundation's
Washington, DC office. Publications about Medicaid and CHIP
include:
Making It Simple: Medicaid for Children and CHIP Income
Eligibility Guidelines and Enrollment Procedures.
Prepared by Donna Cohen Ross and Laura Cox. October
2000.
<http://www.kff.org/content/2000/2166/hjksmall.pdf>.
The Characteristics and Roles of Medicaid-Dominated Managed
Care Plans. Prepared by Suzanne Felt-Lisk. February
2000.
<http://www.kff.org/content/2000/2180/Characteristicsan
dRoles.pdf>
Medicaid Enrollment in 50 States: June 1997 to December 1999.
Prepared by Eileen R. Ellis and David M. Rousseau.
October 2000. <http://www.kff.org/content/2000/2210/>.
Health Coverage for Low-Income Children.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/2144/>.Last updated in
March 2000.
The Kaiser Project on Incremental Health Reform. In November
1996, the Kaiser Family Foundation initiated a project to examine
different strategies for expanding health insurance coverage to
America’s growing uninsured population. The Foundation asked
two leading health policy experts with experience in Democratic
and Republican leadership roles, Judith Feder and Sheila Burke,
to direct the project’s work in considering and evaluating the
potential for, and likely impact of, alternative incremental reform
options. This continuing effort has made important contributions
to the public and policy dialogue about covering the uninsured.
With new proposals emerging across political parties as we head
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into the 2000 election, the project’s analysis of tax-based reform
options along with direct subsidy or government expansion
options is directly relevant and useful to the debate.
Analysis of a Specific Tax/Health Credit That Provides Insurance
to All Children. Wendell Primus.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112d/>.
Children’s Health Insurance Coverage: Tax Credit and Publicly
Sponsored Children’s Insurance Pool. Linda Blumberg.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112e/>.
A Premium Subsidy Program for Modest Income Children. Mark
Merlis and Richard E. Curtis.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112f/>.
Children’s Health Insurance: The Difference Policy Choices
Make. John Holahan, Cori Uccello, and Judith Feder.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112g/>.
The New Child Health Insurance Program: A Carefully Crafted
Compromise. Alan Weil. October 1999.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112l/>.
Expansions in Public Health Insurance and Crowd-Out: What
the Evidence Says. Lisa Dubay. October 1999.
<http://www.kff.org/content/1999/19991112m/>.

A Guide to Managed Care Terms and Acronyms
Medicaid
Title XIX of the Social Security Act is a program which provides
medical assistance for certain individuals and families with low
incomes and resources. The program, known as Medicaid,
became law in 1965 as a jointly funded cooperative venture
between the federal and state governments to assist states in the
provision of adequate medical care to eligible needy persons.
Medicaid is the largest program providing medical and health19
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related services to America’s poorest people. It covers
approximately 36 million individuals including children, the
aged, blind, and/or disabled, and people who are eligible to
receive federally-assisted income maintenance payments.
Within broad national guidelines which the federal government
provides, each of the states:
1. establishes its own eligibility standards;
2. determines the type, amount, duration, and scope of services;
3. sets the rate of payment for services; and
4. administers its own program.
Thus, the Medicaid program varies considerably from state to
state, as well as within each state over time. (From the HCFA
Web site, at <http://www.hcfa.gov>.)
Section 1915(b) Waiver

The Social Security Act authorizes the Secretary of the
Department of Health and Human Services to waive requirements
of Section 1902 of the Act to administer specific freedom of
choice waiver programs to mandatorily enroll beneficiaries in
managed care programs, provide additional services via savings
produced by managed care, create a “carve-out” delivery system
for specialty care, and/or create programs that are not available
statewide. In 1998, 35 states and the District of Columbia
operated 84 Section 1915(b) waivers.
Children’s Health Insurance Program (CHIP)
Also known as Title XXI of the Social Security Act, CHIP was
established by Congress in the Balanced Budget Act of 1997
(P.L. 105-33). CHIP provides states with funds to provide health
insurance for children whose families earn too much to qualify
for Medicaid, yet not enough to afford private health insurance.
At the federal level, CHIP is administered by the Health Care
Financing Administration, which also administers Medicare and
Medicaid.
20

Deborah A. Freund

States have three options for covering uninsured children. They
can use CHIP funds to provide coverage through separate
children’s health insurance programs, expand coverage available
under Medicaid, or combine both strategies. An additional goal
of SCHIP is to identify and enroll children already eligible for
Medicaid but not enrolled. To date, all 50 states, territories, and
the District of Columbia have established CHIP programs.
Title XXI requires performance measurement, evaluation, and the
collection and analysis of data that are critical to understanding
the impact of CHIP on children’s coverage, access to care, and
use of health care services. Many states have also streamlined
the application process, and improved procedures to assure that
children retain coverage for as long as they are eligible.
CHIP eligibility is generally limited to “targeted low-income
children,” defined in section 2110 of Title XXI as a child whose
family income exceeds the Medicaid applicable income level, but
not by more than 50 percent, or whose family income is at or
below 200 percent of the federal poverty lines, whichever is
higher. However, states have broad flexibility under the federal
SCHIP law to provide coverage to children at higher income
levels through the use of income disregards. (Summarized from
The Children’s Health Insurance Program web site at
<http://www.hcfa.gov/init/children.htm>.)
Managed Care
A managed care plan integrates the financing and delivery of
specified health care services by means of four key elements:
1. arrangements with selected providers to furnish a
comprehensive set of health care services to plan members;
2. explicit standards for the selection of participating health care
providers;
3. formal programs of quality assurance and utilization review;
4. significant incentives for members to use providers associated
with the plan.
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Prepaid Group Practice
Health benefit plans that provide a defined set of health services
to an enrolled population for a predetermined premium.
Provider Network
An organizations of providers (physicians and hospitals) that
services managed care plans. Network providers are selected with
the expectation that they will deliver care inexpensively, and
enrollees are channeled to network providers to control costs.
Individual providers may belong to several different networks.
Individual managed care plans may develop their own networks
by contracting directly with providers, “rent” access to existing
networks, or pool their local networks to build networks over
large geographic areas.
Indemnity Health Insurance Plan with Utilization Controls
(“Managed” Indemnity Insurance)
These plans allow freedom of choice of provider and pay
providers on the basis of undiscounted fee-for-service. Plans
typically employ some form of utilization management such as
preadmission certification and concurrent review for
hospitalizations and high-cost care management (see Utilization
Management below). Under current rubric, these plans are not
considered to be “managed care.”
Forms of Managed Care
Health Maintenance Organization (HMO)

The term “health maintenance organization” was coined by Dr.
Paul Ellwood, who had concluded that fee-for-service
compensation arrangements created “perverse incentives” which
rewarded physicians and institutions for treating illness and then
withdrew those rewards when health was restored. Ellwood
proposed a nationwide system of prepaid group practices, which
he believed would help control costs and provide effective care.
This became the focus of President Nixon’s 1971 Health
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Message to Congress and led to support for development of
HMOs in the 1973 HMO Act (Lee 1997).
A health maintenance organization is a managed care plan that
provides a wide range of comprehensive health care services to
an enrolled population of patients for a fixed periodic payment
(called a capitation rate). In addition to the four key elements of
managed care plans enumerated above, HMOs typically employ
some form of capitation payment to providers and provider risk
sharing, and many deliver care through integrated medical
facilities.
Four models of HMOs have been identified:
1. Staff model HMOs provide services directly through
physicians who are salaried employees of the plan.
2. Group model HMOs contract with an independent group of
practitioners to provide services.
3. Network HMOs contract with two or more group practices.
Under both the group and network models, physicians may be
paid on a fee-for-service, salaried, or capitated basis.
4. Independent practice association (IPA) HMOs contract
directly with individual physicians in private practice.
Physicians are paid on either a discounted fee-for-service or
capitation basis.
Preferred Provider Organization (PPO)

An arrangement by an insurer to provide medical services
through a panel of preferred providers who contract to deliver
services at lower-than-usual fees in exchange for prompt payment
and a certain volume of patients. The PPO usually also provides
some utilization review services. Enrollees are not restricted to
the panel of providers but incur lower out-of-pocket costs if they
use participating providers.
Point-of-Service (POS) Plan

Combines characteristics of both HMOs and PPOs to balance
cost control with freedom of choice. Enrollees select a primary
care physician gatekeeper from a network of physicians
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contracted to the plan. The cost to the enrollee for care provided
by a network provider is very low or nothing. Enrollees may
obtain care from out-of-plan providers but with significantly
higher cost sharing.
Primary Care Case Management (PCCM)

A form of managed care for Medicaid enrollees under which a
specific person or agency (typically a clinic), called a gatekeeper
(see definition below), is responsible for coordinating the medical
care of an enrollee and for arranging for necessary referrals to
consultants, hospitals, or special services. Prior approval of the
gatekeeper for specialty or hospital care is typically required
except in true life-or-death emergencies.
Single Service or Target Managed Care

Managed care applied to specific services, such as mental health
and substance abuse services, prescription drugs, and dental care.
Plans may include utilization review, networks with gatekeepers,
case management services, and discounted prices from network
providers.
Important Cost and Utilization Management Features of
Managed Care Health Plans
Financial Incentives

Capitation. An all-inclusive payment to a physician or hospital
to provide all specified health care services to an enrollee during
a designated period of time. Places most of the financial risk for
utilization on the provider.
Discounted charges and fee schedules. Managed care plans use
their purchasing power to negotiate fee schedules or percent
discounts from contracted providers’ usual charges for services
provided to enrollees.
Performance incentives. Financial incentives paid to physicians
to encourage cost savings, which may include allowing
physicians to keep the difference between the capitation rate and
actual patient costs, a return of an amount withheld from fee-for-
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service reimbursement to cover potential cost overruns, and/or a
bonus or share in the profit of the organization.
Utilization Management

Precertification, concurrent review, and discharge planning.
Programs designed to reduce the use of inpatient services by
requiring a review of the reasons for an elective admission prior
to the admission (precertification), monitoring the progress of the
patient after admission (concurrent review), and providing for the
expeditious discharge of the patient (discharge planning).
Gatekeeper (case management). Typically a primary care
physician whose role is to refer and authorize payment for
specialty, emergency and hospital care, and other special
services.
Preauthorization. A procedure which requires permission from
the insurer or gatekeeper physician before a patient can use a
service (specialist referral, emergency room visit, hospital
admission) for which the plan will pay.
Physician practice profiles. Profiles of individual physicians’
practice patterns created from claims data, which may be used by
plan medical directors to “educate” providers with divergent
patterns and by plans to purge from their network physicians who
appear to deliver poor quality or excessively expensive care.
High-cost case management. Coordination of health care and
sometimes other support services from a variety of providers for
individuals with complex and length or chronic illnesses. Used to
facilitate cost-effective care, may facilitate home care and reduce
overall costs of expensive illnesses.
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Probable Effects of Different Health Insurance Plans on the Delivery of Medical Care

Ability to choose providers

○

-

-

-

-

-

√Preventative care

○

+

+

+

+

?

√Illness-related visits to primary
care physicians

○

+

+?

+?

+?

?

√Visits to specialists

○

+

?

-

+?

-

Use of diagnostic tests

-

-

-

-

-?

-
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Characteristics of Medical Care

Key: Expected impact of plan on consumer use/physician practice (all else equal) as compared to
traditional fee-for-service indemnity insurance plans or, in the case of Medicaid PCCMs, traditional feefor-service Medicaid plans.
○
No change
Tends to decrease
+
Tends to increase
?
Direction unclear
√

Studied by Freund in her articles

Source:

Freund and Lewit (1993).
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